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SPANISH DYNAMIC PROVISIONS: MAIN NUMERICAL FEATURES
This article contains a detailed numerical analysis of the Spanish dynamic provision, both at 
the whole system level and at the level of different groups of banks. In general terms, the 
maximum amount of general or dynamic provisions accumulated at the peak of the lending 
cycle was almost €26 billion. In relative terms, a coverage of 1.1% of the credit portfolio and 
of almost 1% of total assets was achieved at that peak. Currently, general provisions are 
almost depleted to prove that they were designed as an automatic mechanism to be used 
as a macro-prudential countercyclical tool.
In terms of risk weighted assets, dynamic provisions reached 1.5% of credit risk weighted 
assets at the peak of the cycle which is around half way from the maximum countercyclical 
capital buffer designed for Basel III. The fact that MoU group 1 and group 2 banks had 
accumulated at its peak €7,000 million euro of general or dynamic provisions has reduced in 
an equivalent amount the public capital injections required by these banks. The amount 
saved in this counterfactual exercise is close to 1% of the Spanish GDP.
The Spanish dynamic provision, originally known as statistical provision was introduced 
in Spain in July 2000 as a supervisory instrument to improve the coverage of credit risk 
that existed at that time (generic and specific provisions). As this provisioning system was 
highly pro-cyclical, the final aim of the dynamic provision was to strengthen the solvency 
of the Spanish financial institutions in the short and medium term by reducing that 
procyclicality. 
This report coincides in time with the current debate which focuses on the need to design 
and implement macro-prudential policies which seek the stability of the banking system as 
a whole and its interaction with the real economy. In this context, countercyclical tools have 
emerged naturally as a way of alleviating high procyclicality of financial systems (e.g. Basel 
III countercyclical capital buffer), however their implementation requires a calibration and in 
this field the experience in Spain with the dynamic provision can be considered useful.
The dynamic provision is an instrument of macro-prudential nature, that together with 
specific provisions, is intended to cover the expected loss of a portfolio. The former covers 
unidentified yet latent losses, while the latter covers incurred losses specifically identified 
in a certain loan. 
The simple and transparent mechanism of this provision applies at the banks’ level. Briefly, 
it consists of two sets of elements: the first set applies to the growth of the credit portfolio 
(new credits), and the second set (that of counter-cyclical nature) is determined by comparing 
the average specific provision for the entire system of the last credit cycle with the current 
specific provision of each bank. Additionally, the provisioning fund thus generated has a 
floor and a cap to ensure a minimum supply and avoid excess thereof, respectively.
Thereare three important milestones in the life of the dynamic provision in Spain: 
(i) its initial implementation and accumulation of funds in the third quarter of 2000, 
(ii)  its modification taking place in the first quarter of 2005 to comply and to be consistent 
with the international financial reporting standards (IFRS), and 
1  Introduction
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(iii)  the depletion of the stock of general provisions together with the elimination of the 
existing floor in the last quarter of 2008 to allow banks to weather the current crisis 
with higher loss absorbency capacity. Its main effect came by allowing savings on 
fiscal outlays to take place, therefore reducing the amount of public aid received by 
some institutions during this difficult period. 
This report elaborates on the most notable numerical features of the Spanish dynamic 
provision. As commented in the introduction, dynamic provisions were first set up in Spain 
in 2000 (commonly known at that time as statistical provisions), and were modified in 
2005. Since then, formally, the provision took the name of general provision, while more 
informally it has been called dynamic provision. The formal change in name also 
corresponds to its new formulation to comply and to be consistent with IFRS. Precisely, 
when IFRS came into effect at the beginning of 2005, the provisioning system was slightly 
changed with respect to the original one.
As a reminder, the basic formula describing how the flow of the dynamic or general 
provision (both terms will be indistinctively used to refer to the same concept) is calculated, 
is as follows:
General provision = Credit + (Credit - Specific provision) 
where Credit is the stock of loans at the end of period t and Credit is the variation of credit 
from end of period t-1 to end of period t (positive in a lending expansion, negative in a 
credit crunch). Parameters  and  are set by the Banco de España and allow to discriminate 
among six different credit risk categories of loans.
The above formula is just a simplification of the real one. Banco de España, based on historical 
information of credit losses, identifies six risk buckets, or homogeneous groups of risk, to 
take into account the nature and risk of different types of credit products (distinct credit 
segments of homogenous loan portfolios), each of them with a different  and parameter. 
The groups (in ascending order of risk) are the following: 
i)  Negligible risk: includes cash and public-sector exposures (both loans and securities) 
as well as interbank exposures; 
ii)  Low risk: made up of mortgages with a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio below 80% and 
exposures to corporations with A rating or higher; 
iii)  Medium-low risk: composed of mortgages with an LTV ratio above 80% and other 
collateralized loans not previously mentioned; 
iv)  Medium risk: made up of other loans, including unrated or below-A rated corporate 
exposures and exposures to small and medium-sized firms; 
v)  Medium-high risk: consumer durables financing; and finally, 
vi) High risk: credit card exposures and overdrafts.
The values for  are (moving from lower to higher risk levels): 0%, 0.6%, 1.5%, 1.8%, 2%, 
and 2.5%; and those for  are the following: 0%, 0.11%, 0.44%, 0.65%, 1.1%, and 1.64%. 
2  Main numerical 
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The final formula to be applied by each bank is therefore:
where dot.gen is the dynamic provision set aside in period t, dot.espe is flow of specific 
provisions set aside in period t, C is the stock of loans at the end of period t, and C its 
variation from end of period t-1 to end of period t.
Based on individual data, the main charts that set in context the dynamic provision are the 
following:
Table 1 shows how the stock of the general provision for the entire system of deposit 
institutions1 has evolved along time since its inception in 2000. It must be noted the 
structural change affecting this provision that took place in 2005 as commented before 
(data for end-2004 were already reported by banks using the new definition of the general 
provision and as such is presented). 
Before 2004 the stock of general provisions is presented in the table as the sum of the 
statistical provision plus the so-called generic provision existing at that time and applied 
to normal credits granted during the period (new loans). 
2.1  TOTAL SYSTEM NUMERICAL 
FEATURES
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Before 2004 the stock of general provisions is computed as the sum of the statistical provision plus the so-called generic provision existing at that time and applied 
to normal credits conceded during the period (new loans). This generic provision consisted of applying a 0.5 % charge on new mortgage loans and a 1.0 % on the 
rest of new loans. In 2000, just before statistical provisions were set aside, the generic provision amounted to €5,300 million.
b Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions.
c Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions excluding those exposures with no risk, i.e., exposures assigned a zero weight (negligible risk) 
for general provision.
Date
Stock of 
General 
Provision (a) 
(m€)
Credit 
Exposures (b) 
(m€)
%
Credit 
Exposures (c) 
(m€)
%
Total Assets 
(m€)
%
RWA (Credit) 
(m€)
%
2000/12 6,518 587,763 1.11% 541,233 1.20% 1,122,857 0.58% 781,229 0.83%
2001/12 9,063 662,134 1.37% 612,264 1.48% 1,227,209 0.74% 851,535 1.06%
2002/12 10,902 728,702 1.50% 685,481 1.59% 1,305,196 0.84% 878,091 1.24%
2003/12 13,880 853,939 1.63% 796,625 1.74% 1,463,261 0.95% 969,031 1.43%
2004/12 14,933 1,396,180 1.07% 974,185 1.53% 1,702,156 0.88% 1,210,278 1.23%
2005/12 18,209 1,729,815 1.05% 1,208,368 1.51% 2,071,543 0.88% 1,452,756 1.25%
2006/12 23,107 2,030,690 1.14% 1,514,780 1.53% 2,415,746 0.96% 1,775,846 1.30%
2007/12 25,836 2,302,266 1.12% 1,729,981 1.49% 2,825,122 0.91% 2,020,213 1.28%
2008/12 20,129 2,401,172 0.84% 1,772,496 1.14% 3,070,302 0.66% 1,804,387 1.12%
2009/12 10,411 2,399,729 0.43% 1,681,722 0.62% 3,090,315 0.34% 1,827,388 0.57%
2010/12 6,993 2,354,828 0.30% 1,621,439 0.43% 3,070,930 0.23% 1,786,640 0.39%
2011/12 4,878 2,254,761 0.22% 1,491,681 0.33% 3,158,246 0.15% 1,708,434 0.29%
2012/12 3,292 2,162,464 0.15% 1,299,904 0.25% 3,098,908 0.11% 1,484,043 0.22%
STOCK OF GENERAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND CREDIT RISK RWAs TABLE 1 
1  Data presented in this paper is based on an individual basis recollecting only domestic business (business in 
Spain) the focus of which the general provision is based on. 
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From that table it can be seen that during the accumulation period the stock of provisions 
raised up to almost €26,000 million. The depletion period, starting in 2008, left almost 
empty the existing stock (€3,000 million). In percentage terms, the fund decreased up to 
87% with respect to its peak.
Chart 1, compares the evolution of the stock of general provisions with that of specific 
provisions. At the same time, it shows the difference between the initial statistical provision 
(2000-2004) and the general provision (from 2005 onwards).
Chart 2, presents the coverage percentage of the stock of specific and general provisions. 
The former is applied to the amount of impaired loans and the latter only to normal credits 
(i.e. credits upon which the general provision is applied). As commented before, the 
reduction in coverage that appears in 2004 is due to the new definition of the general 
provision. Since the end of 2004 the interbank exposures were also included in the 
category of risks subject to general provisions resulting in an increase in the base upon 
which the general provision was calculated without increasing the provision fund as these 
exposures were assigned a zero weight (see this effect more clearly in Table 1 column 
credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions).
Chart 3, shows the coverage of non-performing loans, NPL, when all provisions (specific 
plus general) are taken into consideration. It can also be observed the breakdown between 
general and specific provisions and their respective coverage of NPLs. It is evident from 
this chart the significant coverage of NPL that existed during the early 2000s peaking 
close at a 250% coverage.
To have the complete picture of the evolution of the main banking elements, Chart 4 
presents the credit cycle in Spain. It shows the growth path of credit exposures during the 
last decade as well as the change in trend for the non-performing loans. Form that chart it 
is evident as the economic cycle turned negative that growth for credit exposures came to 
a halt and also evident is the abrupt increase in non-performing loans for banks.
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In setting up the context, it is also worth noting the relative weight that the general provision 
represents in terms of other relevant balance sheet items. In this respect, Table 1 presents, 
during the periods of accumulation and depletion of general provisions, how the stock of 
this provision compares with the stock of credit over which the provision pivots, with that 
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same stock of credit but excluding those credit exposures assigned a zero weight (no-risk 
exposures), with the amount of total assets, and with credit risk weighted assets (RWAs).
In this vein, it can be seen that the stock of general provisions, at the peak of the lending 
cycle, amounted up to 1.1% of the total stock of credit upon which it was calculated (1.5% 
credit with positive weight). In terms of assets, during peak years, provisions almost 
represented 1% of total assets (0.96%). As commented before, it can be appreciated how 
the change in the definition of the base upon which general provisions were calculated 
(interbank exposures included within the base of calculation of the general provision), 
implies a sudden increase in this base in 2004. However, as this increase was due to the 
inclusion of exposures with zero weight, the volume of exposures only subject to positive 
weights (fourth column) is not affected in such a way.
To finalize the broad context into which general provisions are set, Table 2 presents the 
overall stock of credit provisions (specific plus general) and its weight in terms of total 
credit exposures, total assets and total RWAs.
Table 3, compares the general provision with the specific provision and also shows its 
relative weight over total credit provisions. Related to this point, it can be appreciated for 
the accumulative phase the dominant position of the general provisions on the overall 
chart of total provisions (a peak of nearly 85% of total provisions). 
Contrarily, during the depletion phase (2008 onwards), it is the specific provision which 
accounts for most of the weight in total provisions as expected, that is, if the countercyclical 
nature of the general provision is borne in mind (less than 3% of total provisions). The 
formula discussed above and their associated alpha and beta parameter provides an 
automatic mechanism to accumulate and to release general provisions which is the key 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Total provisions: sum of speci?c and general provision. 
b Credit Exposures subject to the application of general and speci?c provisions.
Date
Stock of Total 
Provision (a) (m€)
Credit Exposures 
(b) (m€)
% Total Assets (m€) %
RWA (Total)
(m€)
%
2000/12 9,806 593,858 1.65% 1,122,857 0.87% 828,229 1.18%
2001/12 12,410 669,027 1.85% 1,227,209 1.01% 902,925 1.37%
2002/12 14,982 737,009 2.03% 1,305,196 1.15% 923,406 1.62%
2003/12 18,068 862,995 2.09% 1,463,261 1.23% 1,013,010 1.78%
2004/12 18,854 1,405,397 1.34% 1,702,156 1.11% 1,252,994 1.50%
2005/12 22,345 1,741,392 1.28% 2,071,543 1.08% 1,532,783 1.46%
2006/12 27,426 2,045,772 1.34% 2,415,746 1.14% 1,858,652 1.48%
2007/12 32,940 2,343,911 1.41% 2,825,122 1.17% 2,094,768 1.57%
2008/12 41,855 2,516,320 1.66% 3,070,302 1.36% 2,051,378 2.04%
2009/12 48,973 2,564,898 1.91% 3,090,315 1.58% 2,064,372 2.37%
2010/12 65,703 2,557,180 2.57% 3,070,930 2.14% 2,045,500 3.21%
2011/12 77,981 2,503,223 3.12% 3,158,246 2.47% 1,944,622 4.01%
2012/12 123,683 2,424,850 5.10% 3,098,908 3.99% 1,714,409 7.21%
STOCK OF TOTAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND TOTAL RWAs  TABLE 2 
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element of its macro-prudential usefulness. It is also clear that the mechanism is transparent 
as a result of being a rule-based instrument both in the upswing and in the downturn2.
It may also be interesting to have an idea of how demanding for banks’ results general 
provisions have been. In other words, it is worth noting to quantify the impact of general 
provisions on the profit and loss account (P&L), that is, how many resources from banks’ 
benefits these provisions detracted every year (or contributed to in case of periods of 
recession).
For the entire system of deposit institutions, it can be seen (Chart 5) how the flow of 
general provisions detracted, during the expansionary years between 15% and 20% 
of pre-provisioning profit (PPP). Nevertheless, during the depletion period, it contributed 
2  In some circumstances, the progressive decumulation mechanism could be, to some extent, slowed down if a 
sharp and sudden crisis would imply very high specific provisions that would make the general provision disappear 
very quickly.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
(m€)
Stock of Speci?c 
Provision
Stock of General 
Provision
Total Provisions
% General Provision 
over Total Provision
2000/12 3,288 6,518 9,806 66.47%
2001/12 3,347 9,063 12,410 73.03%
2002/12 4,080 10,902 14,982 72.77%
2003/12 4,187 13,880 18,068 76.82%
2004/12 3,921 14,933 18,854 79.20%
2005/12 4,136 18,209 22,345 81.49%
2006/12 4,319 23,107 27,426 84.25%
2007/12 7,104 25,836 32,940 78.43%
2008/12 21,726 20,129 41,855 48.09%
2009/12 38,563 10,411 48,973 21.26%
2010/12 58,711 6,993 65,703 10.64%
2011/12 73,103 4,878 77,981 6.26%
2012/12 120,391 3,292 123,683 2.66%
BREAK-DOWN OF CREDIT PROVISIONS TABLE 3 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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to ameliorate the pre-provisioning chart up to 24%. In terms of profits before taxes, (PBT) 
the impact is even higher, with an impact of up to 29% in good times and a contribution of 
around 60% in bad times.
Another main element of the general provision is its limits. Table 4 provides the following 
information: the stock of dynamic provisions, the maximum limit per year, the difference 
between the actual provision and the theoretical limit, and the amount of provision that could 
still be set aside if the maximum limit would apply instead of the actual level of provision 
existing in each period (in percentage of the maximum limit). For coherence purposes, in this 
table before 2005 the stock of general provision only includes the so-called statistical 
provision. Otherwise, the calculation and consideration of limits would make no sense.
According to the charts presented, it can be said that, for the entire system of deposit 
institutions, the maximum limit was never reached, although this has to be taken with 
certain caution because all computations have been made using the aggregate chart for 
the system as a whole and no the individual chart of each bank. As a result of this 
aggregation, there are discrepancies with respect to the exact number that would be 
obtained if other aggregation was used or if banks were analyzed one by one. 
With the above caveat in mind, it can be said that it was in 2004, 2005 and 2006 when the 
stock of existing provisions was closest to the maximum limit but yet a 5% (around €1 billion) 
away from it. Regarding the minimum limit, it was eliminated in 2008, providing banks additional 
room of maneuver to deal with the increase in losses that they started to experience as the 
crisis began.
Another interesting element of the general provision is the distribution of exposures across 
the six different categories of risk. Table 5 shows this distribution.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For coherence purposes, before 2005 general provision only includes the so-called statistical provision. 
Otherwise, the calculation and consideration of limits would not make any sense.
(m€)
General provision (a) Max. limit
Difference:  Distance 
to the limit
% left to reach
the max.
2000/12 1,184 7,312 6,127 83.80%
2001/12 3,117 8,053 4,936 61.29%
2002/12 4,464 8,678 4,215 48.57%
2003/12 6,645 9,596 2,951 30.76%
2004/12 14,933 15,509 786 5.07%
2005/12 18,209 19,028 993 5.22%
2006/12 23,107 24,322 1,411 5.80%
2007/12 25,836 27,768 2,087 7.52%
2008/12 20,129 27,837 7,779 27.95%
2009/12 10,411 25,692 15,347 59.74%
2010/12 6,993 24,656 17,702 71.80%
2011/12 4,878 22,533 17,654 78.35%
2012/12 3,292 19,798 16,506 87.15%
LIMITS SET ON THE GENERAL PROVISION TABLE 4 
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In this table it can be noticed how the different types of exposures have evolved over time. In 
particular, the so-called no-risk exposures increase their weight over total exposures from 
almost 8% to almost 40% in 2012 (note that from 2004 onwards interbank exposures were 
included in this category enlarging the weight of this group when compared with the rest of 
categories). In addition to that, medium-low and medium risk exposures over total exposures 
decreased their relevance in banks’ credit portfolios moving from 16% and 37% to 11% 
and 17% respectively.
Table 6 provides information in terms of the distribution of the general provision across 
categories of risk. In that respect, it can be seen that due to the assigned values of  and  
to the different categories (increasing in risk) and the distribution of exposures as presented 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
No risk
Low
risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 7.9% 29.8% 16.2% 37.0% 7.5% 1.5%
2001/12 7.5% 31.5% 17.3% 34.7% 7.3% 1.5%
2002/12 5.9% 33.2% 19.8% 33.3% 6.3% 1.4%
2003/12 6.7% 33.9% 24.0% 28.9% 5.1% 1.3%
2004/12 30.5% 26.0% 18.6% 20.9% 3.1% 0.9%
2005/12 30.3% 26.8% 20.0% 19.5% 2.7% 0.8%
2006/12 25.5% 26.9% 22.5% 21.6% 2.7% 0.8%
2007/12 24.9% 27.2% 22.7% 21.6% 2.7% 0.8%
2008/12 26.2% 28.8% 20.7% 21.1% 2.4% 0.8%
2009/12 30.0% 29.5% 19.1% 18.8% 1.9% 0.7%
2010/12 31.2% 29.7% 17.4% 19.2% 1.8% 0.8%
2011/12 33.9% 29.4% 15.2% 19.2% 1.6% 0.7%
2012/12 39.9% 27.3% 11.1% 17.4% 3.6% 0.7%
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK TABLE 5 
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 – 7.2% 15.6% 53.6% 18.1% 5.5%
2001/12 – 7.8% 17.1% 51.4% 18.1% 5.6%
2002/12 – 8.4% 19.9% 50.4% 15.9% 5.4%
2003/12 – 9.1% 25.6% 46.4% 13.6% 5.4%
2004/12 – 17.0% 32.3% 41.5% 6.9% 2.3%
2005/12 – 17.3% 35.3% 39.3% 6.0% 2.1%
2006/12 – 16.2% 36.7% 39.5% 5.5% 2.1%
2007/12 – 16.3% 36.8% 39.5% 5.4% 2.0%
2008/12 – 18.0% 35.2% 39.5% 5.5% 1.9%
2009/12 – 21.2% 34.8% 36.3% 5.6% 2.0%
2010/12 – 22.5% 29.9% 39.3% 5.7% 2.7%
2011/12 – 22.9% 27.6% 42.0% 4.8% 2.7%
2012/12 – 21.3% 19.5% 45.3% 9.3% 4.6%
DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL PROVISION ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK TABLE 6
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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in the previous table, it is the medium-risk category which presents the largest proportion of 
provisions in terms of the total amount of general provisions. Then, the medium-low and the 
low risk categories appear in subsequent importance.
Table 7 presents the coverage of exposures with general provisions per category of risk 
and how it has evolved along time. In this vein, it can be seen how, as the crisis gained 
momentum, the coverage of exposures, depending on the categories of risk in which they 
were classified, changed. It is also shown the current situation (end-2012) in terms of 
coverage that normal credit presents according to the different categories of risk. 
To put Table 7 charts into perspective, it is important to realize that, for instance, according 
to Table 1, in December 2007, at the peak of the accumulation of dynamic provisions, the 
coverage of credit exposures with general provisions was 1.5%. This coverage ranges from 
0.7% to 2.8% for the five risk categories, consistently with the risk profile of each of them.
Finally, a simple but useful exercise can be carried out by comparing the maximum amount 
of general provision fund created per category of risk and the losses (proxied by provisions 
for non-performing loans) that each category of risk experienced during the current crisis. 
This is done by comparing the accumulated flow of specific provisions set aside during the 
period 2008-2012 with the maximum amount of general provision that each category of 
risk accumulated during the boom period. This comparison is presented in Table 8. 
This exercise is the best proxy for a final assessment that cannot be carried out now and that 
consists of comparing the total final losses in each risk category with the amount of general 
provisions accumulated, together with the amount of exposures in each risk category. 
Until the crisis is completely over and all the losses are fully materialized, it is not possible 
to carry out a fully-fledged assessment of dynamic provision coverage performance. In 
this regard, the current exercise presented in this paper could be biased in two directions: 
upwards if provisioning requirements continue to increase in the future, or downwards as 
a result of recoveries from realization of collateral and late repayments made by borrowers.
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 – 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.5% 0.7%
2001/12 – 0.1% 0.5% 0.7% 1.2% 1.7%
2002/12 – 0.2% 0.6% 0.9% 1.5% 2.3%
2003/12 – 0.2% 0.8% 1.2% 2.1% 3.1%
2004/12 – 0.7% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.9%
2005/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.1% 2.3% 2.9%
2006/12 – 0.7% 1.8% 2.1% 2.3% 2.9%
2007/12 – 0.7% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2% 2.8%
2008/12 – 0.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 2.1%
2009/12 – 0.3% 0.8% 0.8% 1.2% 1.2%
2010/12 – 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 1.0% 1.0%
2011/12 – 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8%
2012/12 – 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8%
COVERAGE OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK TABLE 7
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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Turning to Table 8, it can be seen how the accumulated flow of specific provisions for the 
total credit portfolio generated from 2008 to 2012 raised up to almost €188,000 million. 
Taking into account that the maximum general provision fund (stock) amounted to almost 
€26,000 million, the potential coverage of losses in terms of generated specific provisions 
can be said to be at 13.7%. 
Bearing the above in mind, it can be appreciated to what extent the necessary specific 
provisions, accumulated for the different categories of risk for the period cited above, have 
theoretically been covered by the general provision. Whereas, the medium-low risk 
category reached a coverage above 20%, the medium-high risk category only reached a 
coverage of 6.2%. 
It is also interesting to notice that accumulated specific provisions as a percentage of the 
total exposure, 8.7%, is increasingly spread across risk categories depending on the implicit 
risk assumed for each one. Clearly, the perception of risk assumed for each risk category in 
the design of the general provision is justified according to the specific provisions made 
during the current crisis (5.3% for the low risk category and 41.2% for the highest risk 
category, Table 9).
In terms of the current Basel III countercyclical capital buffer (a maximum of 2.5% of RWA), 
the general provision at its peak as conceived ten years ago, would have represented 
almost half of the maximum amount of this new countercyclical capital buffer requirement. 
That is, the general provision at its peak was 1.5% of credit risk weighted assets (1.23% 
of total risk weighted assets) according to Basel rules, covering ex-post 13.7% of 
accumulated specific provisions.
Following the line of reasoning in the former paragraph, it is important to notice that while 
the dynamic provision buffer reached about 50% of the maximum amount of a buffer 
similar to the current countercyclical one set in Basel III, the expected losses, which are 
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
187,968 31,457 47,063 75,262 22,508 5,995 6,489
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
8.7% 5.3% 19.7% 20.0% 28.7% 41.2% 0.8%
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
25,837 4,194 9,448 10,137 1,387
13.7% 13.3% 20.1% 13.5% 6.2%
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012). Million €
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012) over Credit exposure (end-2012)
Maximum Provision Fund Accumulated per category of risk. Million €
Coverage of Provisions derived from NPLs with stock of General Provision per category of risk
8.6%
515
High risk
APPROACH TO CREDIT EXPOSURES COVERAGE TABLE 8
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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the target of provisions, are around four/five times lower than unexpected losses, usually 
covered with capital (Repullo et al 2010)3. This helps to put into perspective the 1.5% 
credit risk weighted assets (1.23% of total risk weighted assets) reached by Spanish 
dynamic provisions at the peak of the cycle. 
The thorough analysis of the impact of dynamic provisions on the lending cycle is very 
complex and clearly exceeds the objective of this document. Nevertheless, Box 1 below 
shows preliminary results (not yet published in a Journal) that try to measure carefully such 
an impact. 
To understand how all the charts commented above have evolved and what they represent 
depending on the different types of banks of the Spanish banking system, a breakdown is 
provided considering the distinction among national banks, former savings banks and 
credit cooperatives
Table 9 shows how the stock of the general provision for the group of national banks 
(Spanish commercial banks) has evolved along time since its creation in 2000. From that 
table it can also be seen that during the accumulation period the stock of provisions raised 
up to almost €11,000 million. The depletion period, starting in 2008, left almost empty the 
existing stock (€1,000 million, 90% reduction with respect to its peak).
2.2 NATIONAL BANKS
3  Rafael Repullo, Jesús Saurina and Carlos Trucharte: “Mitigating the Pro-Cyclicality of Basel II”, Economic Policy, 
CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 25, pages 659-702, October 2010.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Before 2004 the stock of general provisions is computed as the sum of the statistical provision plus the so-called generic provision existing at that time and applied 
to normal credits conceded during the period (new loans). This generic provision consisted of applying a 0.5% charge on new mortgage loans and a 1.0% on the 
rest of new loans.
b Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions.
c Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions without including those exposures with no risk, i.e., exposures assigned a zero weight (negligible 
risk) for general provision.
Date
Stock of general 
provision (a) (m€)
Credit 
exposures 
(b) (m€)
%
Credit 
exposures 
(c) (m€)
%
Total assets 
(m€)
%
RWA 
(Credit) (m€)
%
2000/12 2,991 280,087 1.07% 249,319 1.20% 575,133 0.52% 439,929 0.68%
2001/12 4,023 306,667 1.31% 271,966 1.48% 612,462 0.66% 464,317 0.87%
2002/12 4,587 315,816 1.45% 289,322 1.59% 620,774 0.74% 441,247 1.04%
2003/12 5,834 370,914 1.57% 330,315 1.77% 687,050 0.85% 471,728 1.24%
2004/12 6,618 625,843 1.06% 392,230 1.69% 784,215 0.84% 633,730 1.04%
2005/12 7,853 768,725 1.02% 470,629 1.67% 957,438 0.82% 738,999 1.06%
2006/12 9,844 837,391 1.18% 584,240 1.68% 1,059,923 0.93% 874,332 1.13%
2007/12 10,880 926,989 1.17% 656,337 1.66% 1,246,377 0.87% 990,186 1.10%
2008/12 8,655 990,966 0.87% 674,795 1.28% 1,389,598 0.62% 887,846 0.97%
2009/12 3,108 981,823 0.32% 637,519 0.49% 1,377,786 0.23% 914,958 0.34%
2010/12 1,624 982,419 0.17% 632,464 0.26% 1,386,674 0.12% 939,916 0.17%
2011/12 1,274 952,548 0.13% 594,913 0.21% 1,438,910 0.09% 947,525 0.13%
2012/12 1,037 970,201 0.11% 591,358 0.18% 1,519,181 0.07% 926,397 0.11%
STOCK OF GENERAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND CREDIT RISK RWAs 
(NATIONAL BANKS)  
TABLE 9
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Chart 6, compares the evolution of the stock of general provisions with that of specific 
provisions. At the same time, it shows the difference between the initial statistical provision 
(2000-2004) and the general provision (from 2005 onwards).
Chart 7, presents the percentage coverage of the stock of specific and general provisions 
respectively applied to non-performing loans and to normal credits (over which the general 
provision is applied).
Chart 8, shows the coverage of non-performing loans, NPL, when all provisions (specific 
plus general) are taken into consideration. It can also be observed the breakdown between 
general and specific provisions and their respective coverage of NPLs.
Chart 9, depicts the credit cycle described by the evolution of credit exposures and non-
performing loans. This evolution is similar to the one presented for the entire system, 
showing combination of the deceleration in credit growth together with the abrupt increase 
in bad loans as the crisis started to produce its effects on the economy.
As already done for the total system, it is also worth noting the relative weight that general 
provisions represent in terms of other relevant balance sheet elements for commercial banks. 
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Table 9, presents these charts. In terms of credit exposures, the stock of provisions for 
commercial banks represented up to almost 1.6%. In relation to total assets, provisions 
represented 0.9% of them and up to 1.2% of credit RWAs.
Table 10 presents, during the accumulation and depletion periods, how the stock of total 
provisions (specific and general) compares with the stock of credit over which these provisions 
pivots, with the amount of total assets and with the total amount of RWAs. 
Table 11, compares the general provision with the specific provision and also shows its 
relative weight over total credit provisions. Related to this point, it can be appreciated for 
the accumulative phase the predominant position of the general provisions on the overall 
chart of total provisions. During the depletion phase (2008 onwards), the situation is the 
opposite, it is the specific provisions which account for most of the weight in total 
provisions representing only 2.1% of total credit provisions.
In terms of profits, Chart 10 shows how the flow of general provisions detracted, at most, 
18% of pre-provisioning profit for commercial banks. During the depletion period, it 
contributed to ameliorate the pre-provisioning chart in more than 28%. Regarding PBT, the 
impact is more acute, 24% in good times and a 48% in bad times.
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In terms of the limits, Table 12 provides information about the maximum limit (cap) of the 
general provision per year, the difference between the actual provision and the theoretical 
maximum limit, and the amount of provision that could still be set aside if the maximum 
limit would apply instead of the actual level of provision existing in each period (in 
percentage of the maximum limit).
As commented before, these are aggregated charts and what they describe do not 
correspond exactly to the situation if each and every individual bank that belongs to this 
group was taken into consideration. Nevertheless, and according to the charts in the table, 
Date
Stock of total 
provision (m€)
Credit exposures 
(m€)
% Total assets (m€) %
RWA (Total)
(m€)
%
2000/12 4,474 282,657 1.58% 575,133 0.78% 471,225 0.95%
2001/12 5,563 309,654 1.80% 612,462 0.91% 501,118 1.11%
2002/12 6,541 319,313 2.05% 620,774 1.05% 472,050 1.39%
2003/12 7,693 374,491 2.05% 687,050 1.12% 504,991 1.52%
2004/12 8,229 629,014 1.31% 784,215 1.05% 668,726 1.23%
2005/12 9,496 772,134 1.23% 957,438 0.99% 809,279 1.17%
2006/12 11,352 841,242 1.35% 1,059,923 1.07% 949,750 1.20%
2007/12 12,476 932,870 1.34% 1,246,377 1.00% 1,060,883 1.18%
2008/12 14,673 1,022,314 1.44% 1,389,598 1.06% 1,043,843 1.41%
2009/12 16,337 1,036,499 1.58% 1,377,786 1.19% 1,077,265 1.52%
2010/12 18,910 1,046,864 1.81% 1,386,674 1.36% 1,127,734 1.68%
2011/12 19,709 1,026,850 1.92% 1,438,910 1.37% 1,116,729 1.76%
2012/12 48,491 1,077,492 4.50% 1,519,181 3.19% 1,098,608 4.41%
STOCK OF TOTAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND TOTAL RISK RWAs 
(NATIONAL BANKS) 
TABLE 10
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
m€
Stock of speci?c 
provision
Stock of general 
provision
Total provisions
% General provision 
over total provision
2000/12 1,484 2,991 4,474 66.84%
2001/12 1,540 4,023 5,563 72.31%
2002/12 1,954 4,587 6,541 70.13%
2003/12 1,858 5,834 7,693 75.84%
2004/12 1,610 6,618 8,229 80.43%
2005/12 1,643 7,853 9,496 82.70%
2006/12 1,508 9,844 11,352 86.72%
2007/12 1,597 10,880 12,476 87.20%
2008/12 6,018 8,655 14,673 58.98%
2009/12 13,229 3,108 16,337 19.03%
2010/12 17,286 1,624 18,910 8.59%
2011/12 18,435 1,274 19,709 6.46%
2012/12 47,454 1,037 48,491 2.14%
BREAK-DOWN OF CREDIT PROVISIONS (NATIONAL BANKS) TABLE 11
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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it can be said that, at the national banks’ level, the maximum limit was practically reached. 
Between 2004 and 2007 most banks were setting aside general provisions, basically on 
the verge of the maximum limit. Then, after 2008 the depletion phase started and the 
distance to the cap started to increase showing a significant use of this provision.
The distribution of exposures across the six different categories of risk is presented in 
Table 13. In this table it can be noticed how the different types of exposures have evolved 
over time. In particular, exposures with no risk increase their weight over total exposures 
from 11% in 2000 to almost 40% in 2012 (remember that in 2004 interbank exposures were 
included in this category). At the same time, medium and medium-high risk exposures have 
decreased their importance on banks’ credit portfolios moving from 45% and 8% to 21% 
and 4% respectively.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For coherence purposes, before 2005 general provision only includes the so-called statistical provision. Otherwise, the 
calculation and consideration of limits would not make sense.
m€
General provision (a) Max. Limit
Difference: Distance 
to the limit
% left to reach
the max.
2000/12 421 3,734 3,313 88.73%
2001/12 1,244 3,967 2,722 68.63%
2002/12 1,697 4,022 2,326 57.82%
2003/12 2,630 4,232 1,603 37.87%
2004/12 6,618 6,603 0 0.00%
2005/12 7,853 7,853 0 0.00%
2006/12 9,844 9,917 73 0.73%
2007/12 10,880 11,087 208 1.87%
2008/12 8,655 11,293 2,638 23.36%
2009/12 3,108 10,518 7,409 70.45%
2010/12 1,624 10,450 8,825 84.46%
2011/12 1,274 9,782 8,508 86.98%
2012/12 1,037 9,774 8,737 89.39%
LIMITS SET ON THE GENERAL PROVISION (NATIONAL BANKS) TABLE 12
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Table 14 provides information in terms of the distribution of the general provision across 
categories of risk. As expected from the exposure distribution, it is the medium-risk 
category that presents the largest amount of provisions. Then the medium-low and the low 
risk categories represent the largest shares.
Table 15 presents how the coverage of exposures per category of risk has evolved along 
time. This is coherent with what is expected for a counter-cyclical tool. That is, increasing 
in the expansionary period and shrinking in recession when general provisions are used. 
As the crisis started to affect banks’ situation and business, the coverage of exposures, 
depending on the categories of risk in which they were classified, changed, all of them 
showing a significant reduction.
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 11.0% 22.6% 11.4% 45.3% 8.1% 1.5%
2001/12 11.3% 25.0% 11.8% 41.8% 8.6% 1.5%
2002/12 8.4% 27.8% 14.1% 41.0% 7.2% 1.5%
2003/12 10.9% 28.1% 22.0% 32.8% 4.8% 1.3%
2004/12 37.6% 19.8% 16.2% 22.9% 2.9% 0.8%
2005/12 38.9% 19.9% 17.1% 20.9% 2.4% 0.7%
2006/12 30.3% 21.2% 20.4% 24.2% 3.0% 0.9%
2007/12 29.3% 21.8% 21.4% 23.7% 3.0% 0.8%
2008/12 32.0% 21.8% 19.4% 23.6% 2.5% 0.7%
2009/12 35.1% 21.6% 19.2% 21.4% 2.0% 0.6%
2010/12 35.7% 21.7% 17.9% 22.1% 1.8% 0.8%
2011/12 37.6% 21.7% 15.9% 22.6% 1.6% 0.6%
2012/12 39.1% 22.0% 12.7% 21.2% 4.3% 0.6%
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(NATIONAL BANKS) 
TABLE 13
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 – 8.3% 26.1% 50.4% 10.5% 4.7%
2001/12 – 7.4% 23.2% 51.7% 12.7% 5.0%
2002/12 – 6.6% 13.3% 57.9% 17.1% 5.2%
2003/12 – 5.8% 11.0% 58.2% 19.8% 5.1%
2004/12 – 14.0% 28.7% 48.6% 6.6% 2.2%
2005/12 – 14.6% 31.5% 46.1% 5.7% 2.1%
2006/12 – 13.4% 32.4% 46.0% 5.9% 2.3%
2007/12 – 13.3% 33.8% 45.2% 5.7% 2.0%
2008/12 – 14.2% 32.5% 46.7% 4.9% 1.6%
2009/12 – 15.6% 34.5% 44.7% 3.7% 1.6%
2010/12 – 16.9% 30.9% 45.2% 3.8% 3.1%
2011/12 – 17.5% 28.5% 48.2% 3.9% 2.0%
2012/12 – 15.7% 19.6% 54.2% 7.6% 2.9%
DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL PROVISION ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(NATIONAL BANKS) 
TABLE 14
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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The simple exercise of comparing the maximum amount of general fund created per 
category of risk with the specific provisions that each category of risk accumulated during 
the current crisis, are included in Table 16. In this table, it can be seen how the flow of 
accumulated specific provisions for the total credit portfolio of national commercial banks, 
between 2008 and 2012, raised up to almost €63,000 million. 
Taking into account that the maximum general provision fund amounted to almost €11,000 
million, the potential coverage of realized specific provisions that the general provision 
could have attained was 17.2%. Furthermore, it can be seen how the specific provisions 
from impaired loans in the different categories of risk could have been covered by the 
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
62,954 5,557 11,346 35,954 7,701 2,088 306
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
6.5% 2.6% 9.2% 17.5% 18.5% 34.1% 0.1%
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
10,842 1,441 3,666 4,897 621
17.2% 25.9% 32.3% 13.6% 8.1%
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012). Million €
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012) over Credit exposure (end-2012)
Maximum Provision Fund Accumulated per category of risk. Million €
Coverage of Provisions derived from NPLs with stock of General Provision per category of risk
10.4%
217
High risk
APPROACH TO CREDIT EXPOSURES COVERAGE (NATIONAL BANKS) TABLE 16
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
 
No risk Low risk
Medium-low
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 – 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5%
2001/12 – 0.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6% 1.4%
2002/12 – 0.1% 0.5% 0.8% 1.3% 1.9%
2003/12 – 0.1% 0.2% 0.9% 2.1% 2.0%
2004/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.4% 2.9%
2005/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.4% 3.0%
2006/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.3% 3.0%
2007/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.3% 2.8%
2008/12 – 0.6% 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 2.1%
2009/12 – 0.2% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8%
2010/12 – 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.7%
2011/12 – 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
2012/12 – 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3%
COVERAGE OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(NATIONAL BANKS) 
TABLE 15
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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general provision. Whereas, the medium-low risk category coverage would be above 30%, 
the medium-high risk category coverage would only be at 8%.
In terms of accumulated specific provisions as a percentage of credit, it is interesting to 
notice, as for the total system, that the 6.5% is increasingly spread across risk categories 
depending on the implicit risk assumed for each one (2.6% for the low category of risk 
climbing to 34.1% for the high risk one). The perception of risk in the design of the general 
provision is, therefore, in line with the real risk incurred by each category.
As shown before in previous tables, Table 17 presents how the stock of the general provision 
for the group of former savings banks has changed over time since year 2000. From that 
table it can be seen that during the accumulation period the stock of provisions raised for 
this group of institutions up to more than €12,000 million. The depletion period, starting in 
2008, has left almost empty the existing stock of provisions (€800 million in 2012, 93% 
reduction in the fund). 
It is worth noting that for the so-called group 1 and group 2 banks (classification of banks 
according to the 2012 MoU on the Financial-Sector)4, most of them former savings banks, 
general provisions at the peak of the cycle reached €7,000 million. 
Taking into account that public capital was injected into some of these former savings banks 
to absorb/mitigate the impact of losses in their credit portfolios, it is fair to mention that, at 
2.3 FORMER SAVINGS BANKS
4  These banks are: BFA, Catalunya Bank, NCG, Banco Valencia, BMN, Liberbank, Caja3 and CEISS.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Before 2004 the stock of general provisions is computed as the sum of the statistical provision plus the so-called generic provision existing at that time and applied 
to normal credits conceded during the period (new loans). This generic provision consisted of applying a 0.5% charge on new mortgage loans and a 1.0% on the 
rest of new loans.
b Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions.
c Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions without including those exposures with no risk, i.e., exposures assigned a zero weight (negligible 
risk) for general provision.
Date
Stock of general 
provision (a) (m€)
Credit 
exposures 
(b) (m€)
%
Credit 
exposures 
(c) (m€)
%
Total assets 
(m€)
%
RWA 
(Credit) (m€)
%
2000/12 2,719 246,182 1.10% 232,810 1.17% 414,439 0.66% 277,395 0.98%
2001/12 3,949 286,064 1.38% 274,031 1.44% 461,397 0.86% 318,818 1.24%
2002/12 4,928 333,184 1.48% 321,130 1.53% 511,903 0.96% 362,392 1.36%
2003/12 6,378 394,213 1.62% 381,104 1.67% 568,097 1.12% 410,308 1.55%
2004/12 6,810 553,455 1.23% 449,100 1.52% 668,547 1.02% 484,437 1.41%
2005/12 8,543 686,167 1.24% 560,499 1.52% 807,668 1.06% 604,994 1.41%
2006/12 11,057 873,390 1.27% 712,075 1.55% 996,700 1.11% 769,235 1.44%
2007/12 12,338 1,002,411 1.23% 819,870 1.50% 1,155,001 1.07% 880,886 1.40%
2008/12 9,380 1,021,819 0.92% 837,895 1.12% 1,239,194 0.76% 797,232 1.18%
2009/12 5,679 1,032,774 0.55% 801,406 0.71% 1,280,708 0.44% 796,087 0.71%
2010/12 4,072 1,003,785 0.41% 757,387 0.54% 1,268,251 0.32% 728,978 0.56%
2011/12 2,532 938,800 0.27% 678,042 0.37% 1,300,039 0.19% 648,706 0.39%
2012/12 867 844,341 0.10% 530,385 0.16% 1,172,519 0.07% 450,357 0.19%
STOCK OF GENERAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND CREDIT RISK RWAs 
(FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) 
TABLE 17
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least, the general provisions set aside for these banks saved €7,000 million (almost 1% in 
terms of the GDP) of public money that otherwise (e.g. general provisions not accumulated 
previous to the crisis) must have been injected.
Chart 11, compares the evolution of the stock of general provisions with that of specific 
provisions. At the same time, it shows the difference between the initial statistical provision 
(2000-2004) and the general provision (from 2005 onwards).
Chart 12, presents the percentage coverage of the stock of specific and general provisions. 
The former applied to the total amount of non-performing loans and the latter only to normal 
credits (i.e. credits over which the general provision is applied).
Chart 13, shows the coverage of non-performing loans, NPL, when all provisions (specific plus 
general) are taken into consideration. It can also be observed the breakdown between general 
and specific provisions and their respective coverage of NPLs. The whole picture of the credit 
cycle for the former savings banks is completed with the information included in Chart 14.
The relative weight that general provisions represents in terms of other relevant balance sheet 
elements can be appreciated in Table 17. It presents how the stock of general provisions 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Footnote in Chart 1 also applies to this chart.
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compares with the stock of credit, the amount of total assets, and the credit risk weighted 
assets. In terms of credit, provisions represented 1.6%, 1.1% with respect to total assets, and 
1.5% in terms of credit risk weighted assets. Table 18 presents the overall stock of provisions 
(specific plus general) and its weight in terms of total credit exposures, total assets and total 
RWAs. The increase in non-performing loans and specific provisions during recent years, 
together with the process of deleveraging in this sector, has raised the weight of the stock 
over credit and total assets to 6% and 5% respectively and to more than 12% of RWAs.
Table 19 compares the general provision with the specific provision and also shows its 
relative weight over total credit provisions. Related to this point, it is worth noting how 
during the boom period general provisions represented almost 85% of the total stock of 
provisions. On the contrary, during the recession period, as a result of the application and 
use of general provisions and the increase in specific provisions, the latter gained relevant 
presence in the overall stock of provisions. As the fund of general provisions was almost 
exhausted, it currently represents only 1.4% of total credit provisions.
In terms of impact on profits, Chart 15 shows that the flow of general provisions absorbed, 
in peak years, more than 23% of pre-provisioning profit. On the contrary, during the depletion 
period it contributed to improve the pre-provisioning chart in more than 29%. As commented 
for other groupings, the impact on PBT is more acute, 35% in good times. In bad times, in 
specific years, it helped former savings banks not to incur in losses.
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In terms of the limits set, Table 20 provides information about the maximum limit of the 
general provision per year. As for the other groups analyzed so far, it must be noted that 
the charts in the table are aggregated charts and do not correspond exactly to the situation 
of each individual savings bank. Bearing this in mind, at the savings banks’ level, the 
maximum limit can be said that was almost reached. Between 2004 and 2006 savings 
banks were setting aside general provisions that took their stock to its maximum limit. 
After 2008, when the decumulation phase took placed, the distance to the cap started to 
increase showing the massive use of the general provision made by the savings banks.
Date
Stock of total 
provision (m€)
Credit
exposures (m€)
% Total assets (m€) %
RWA
(Total) (m€)
%
2000/12 4,077 248,828 1.64% 414,439 0.98% 282,100 1.45%
2001/12 5,261 288,952 1.82% 461,397 1.14% 325,290 1.62%
2002/12 6,411 336,605 1.90% 511,903 1.25% 369,783 1.73%
2003/12 7,997 397,894 2.01% 568,097 1.41% 418,214 1.91%
2004/12 8,436 558,162 1.51% 668,547 1.26% 492,968 1.71%
2005/12 10,272 692,398 1.48% 807,668 1.27% 617,586 1.66%
2006/12 13,022 882,361 1.48% 996,700 1.31% 783,665 1.66%
2007/12 16,595 1,033,224 1.61% 1,155,001 1.44% 895,003 1.85%
2008/12 21,408 1,090,635 1.96% 1,239,194 1.73% 874,765 2.45%
2009/12 24,600 1,122,622 2.19% 1,280,708 1.92% 858,041 2.87%
2010/12 36,866 1,118,411 3.30% 1,268,251 2.91% 786,784 4.69%
2011/12 47,183 1,089,008 4.33% 1,300,039 3.63% 703,616 6.71%
2012/12 61,762 974,904 6.34% 1,172,519 5.27% 497,129 12.42%
STOCK OF TOTAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND TOTAL RISK RWAs 
(FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) 
TABLE 18
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
m€
Stock of speci?c 
provision
Stock of general 
provision
Total provisions
% general provision 
over total provision
2000/12 1,358 2,719 4,077 66.69%
2001/12 1,312 3,949 5,261 75.06%
2002/12 1,483 4,928 6,411 76.86%
2003/12 1,619 6,378 7,997 79.75%
2004/12 1,626 6,810 8,436 80.73%
2005/12 1,729 8,543 10,272 83.17%
2006/12 1,965 11,057 13,022 84.91%
2007/12 4,257 12,338 16,595 74.35%
2008/12 12,028 9,380 21,408 43.82%
2009/12 18,921 5,679 24,600 23.08%
2010/12 32,794 4,072 36,866 11.04%
2011/12 44,652 2,532 47,183 5.37%
2012/12 60,895 867 61,762 1.40%
BREAK-DOWN OF CREDIT PROVISIONS (FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) TABLE 19
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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The distribution of exposures across the six different categories of risk appears in Table 21, 
where it can be noticed how the different types of exposures have evolved over time. In 
particular, exposures with no risk increase their weight over total exposures from 5% in 2000 
to 37% in 2012; medium-low and medium risk exposures decreased their weight on savings 
banks’ credit portfolios moving from 22% and 26% to 11% and 13% respectively.
Table 22 provides information in terms of the distribution of the general provision across 
categories of risk. According to the values of  and  and the distribution of exposures, the 
medium-risk category presents the largest amount of provisions. Then, the low and medium-
low risk categories appear in terms of importance.
Table 23 presents the coverage of exposures per category of risk along time. It can be 
seen the levels of coverage reached for each category as a result of the values of the 
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For coherence purposes, before 2005 general provision only includes the so-called statistical provision. Otherwise, the 
calculation and consideration of limits would not make sense.
m€
General provision (a) Max. limit
Difference: Distance 
to the limit
% left to reach
the max.
2000/12 596 2,676 2,080 77.73%
2001/12 1,479 3,095 1,616 52.20%
2002/12 2,146 3,598 1,452 40.35%
2003/12 3,155 4,214 1,059 25.13%
2004/12 6,810 6,839 29 0.43%
2005/12 8,543 8,545 3 0.03%
2006/12 11,057 11,057 0 0.00%
2007/12 12,338 12,666 328 2.59%
2008/12 9,380 12,518 3,138 25.07%
2009/12 5,679 11,481 5,802 50.54%
2010/12 4,072 10,742 6,670 62.09%
2011/12 2,532 9,316 6,784 72.82%
2012/12 867 7,159 6,292 87.89%
LIMITS SET ON THE GENERAL PROVISION (FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) TABLE 20
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parameters  and  set for each category of risk and, during the crisis period, the reduction 
in coverage arriving at the current low levels.
For the exercise of comparing the maximum amount of the general provision fund created 
per category of risk and the flow of specific provisions that for each category of risk were 
set aside during the current crisis, Table 24 includes the following information: the 
accumulated flow of specific provisions for the total credit portfolio of savings banks 
between 2008 and 2012 raised up to more than €107,000 million. Taking into consideration 
that the maximum general provision fund amounted to more than €12,000 million, the 
potential coverage of specific provisions that the general provision could have covered 
Date No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 5.4% 39.3% 22.0% 26.1% 6.0% 1.3%
2001/12 4.2% 39.9% 23.8% 25.5% 5.4% 1.2%
2002/12 3.6% 39.4% 25.9% 24.9% 4.9% 1.2%
2003/12 3.3% 39.8% 26.9% 24.2% 4.6% 1.2%
2004/12 19.1% 32.9% 24.8% 19.1% 3.2% 0.9%
2005/12 18.4% 32.9% 27.0% 18.2% 2.7% 0.8%
2006/12 18.6% 31.1% 28.6% 18.9% 2.2% 0.7%
2007/12 18.3% 31.8% 28.0% 19.1% 2.1% 0.7%
2008/12 18.1% 35.3% 25.7% 18.3% 1.9% 0.7%
2009/12 22.5% 37.1% 22.2% 16.0% 1.5% 0.6%
2010/12 24.6% 37.3% 19.6% 16.5% 1.4% 0.6%
2011/12 27.8% 38.4% 16.5% 15.4% 1.3% 0.6%
2012/12 37.2% 35.8% 10.7% 12.7% 3.2% 0.4%
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) 
TABLE 21
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 – 11.6% 33.6% 38.0% 12.1% 4.7%
2001/12 – 11.2% 30.2% 40.7% 13.0% 5.0%
2002/12 – 10.9% 28.8% 41.6% 13.6% 5.1%
2003/12 – 11.1% 26.4% 42.4% 15.0% 5.2%
2004/12 – 19.9% 37.0% 34.3% 6.4% 2.4%
2005/12 – 19.8% 40.2% 32.7% 5.4% 2.0%
2006/12 – 18.4% 42.2% 33.5% 4.3% 1.7%
2007/12 – 18.9% 41.4% 33.8% 4.1% 1.8%
2008/12 – 21.8% 40.1% 32.4% 3.7% 1.9%
2009/12 – 25.4% 38.3% 31.1% 3.6% 1.6%
2010/12 – 26.3% 32.5% 36.0% 3.8% 1.5%
2011/12 – 28.2% 30.5% 36.3% 3.2% 1.8%
2012/12 – 31.7% 23.3% 34.2% 8.5% 2.3%
DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL PROVISION ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) 
TABLE 22
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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was 11.5%. Similarly, it can also be appreciated how the specific provisions coming from 
impaired credits in the different categories of risk could have been covered by the general 
provision. In this regard, the medium-low risk category could have been covered above 
15% but the medium-high risk category would only have been covered by 4%.
Accumulated specific provisions as a percentage of credit reached 12.7%. In contrast with 
other groupings, this percentage is not distributed in an increasing fashion across risk 
categories. For example, the medium-low risk category percentage (36.8%) is higher than 
a higher risk category: the medium-risk category (28.7%). 
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 – 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9%
2001/12 – 0.1% 0.7% 0.8% 1.2% 2.1%
2002/12 – 0.2% 0.7% 1.1% 1.8% 2.7%
2003/12 – 0.1% 0.4% 0.7% 1.3% 1.8%
2004/12 – 0.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1%
2005/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1%
2006/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1%
2007/12 – 0.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.4% 3.1%
2008/12 – 0.6% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.3%
2009/12 – 0.4% 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.3%
2010/12 – 0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 1.1% 1.0%
2011/12 – 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8%
2012/12 – 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6%
COVERAGE OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) 
TABLE 23
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012). Million €
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
107,105 23,647 33,330 30,876 11,866 1,609 5,332
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012) over Credit exposure (end-2012)
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
12.7% 7.8% 36.8% 28.7% 44.1% 49.0% 1.7%
Maximum Provision Fund Accumulated per category of risk. Million €
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
12,271 2,315 5,075 4,152 508
Coverage of Provisions derived from NPLs with stock of General Provision per category of risk
11.5% 9.8% 15.2% 13.4% 4.3% 13.7%
221
High risk
APPROACH TO CREDIT EXPOSURES COVERAGE (FORMER SAVINGS BANKS) TABLE 24
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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Table 25 presents the stock of the general provision for the group of credit cooperatives 
and its evolution since year 2000. It can be seen that the peak of provisions was reached 
in 2007 when the fund amount up to more than €1,300 million. The depletion period, 
starting in 2008, reduced the fund of provisions down to €400 million, i.e. a 68% reduction.
Chart 16, compares the evolution of the stock of general provisions with that of specific 
provisions accounting for the difference between the initial statistical provision (2000-2004) 
and the general provision (from 2005 onwards). Chart 17, presents the percentage coverage 
2.4 CREDIT COOPERATIVES
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Before 2004 the stock of general provisions is computed as the sum of the statistical provision plus the so-called generic provision existing at that time and applied 
to normal credits conceded during the period (new loans). This generic provision consisted of applying a 0.5% charge on new mortgage loans and a 1.0% on the 
rest of new loans.
b Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions.
c Credit exposures subject to the application of general provisions without including those exposures with no risk, i.e., exposures assigned a zero weight (negligible 
risk) for general provision.
Date
Stock of general 
provision (a) (m€)
Credit 
exposures 
(b) (m€)
%
Credit 
exposures 
(c) (m€)
%
Total assets 
(m€)
%
RWA 
(Credit) (m€)
%
2000/12 328 26,103 1.26% 25,705 1.28% 39,607 0.83% 28,252 1.16%
2001/12 478 30,922 1.54% 30,482 1.57% 46,064 1.04% 33,175 1.44%
2002/12 645 37,127 1.74% 36,635 1.76% 50,490 1.28% 37,813 1.70%
2003/12 830 44,922 1.85% 44,440 1.87% 56,165 1.48% 43,728 1.90%
2004/12 837 61,439 1.36% 51,718 1.62% 66,349 1.26% 50,127 1.67%
2005/12 1,002 75,308 1.33% 64,152 1.56% 80,546 1.24% 60,460 1.66%
2006/12 1,198 90,545 1.32% 77,133 1.55% 96,207 1.25% 71,823 1.67%
2007/12 1,362 100,715 1.35% 88,330 1.54% 108,429 1.26% 82,370 1.65%
2008/12 1,057 100,880 1.05% 90,131 1.17% 113,010 0.94% 73,173 1.44%
2009/12 773 105,606 0.73% 88,851 0.87% 119,457 0.65% 73,861 1.05%
2010/12 515 107,168 0.48% 89,345 0.58% 121,577 0.42% 73,464 0.70%
2011/12 436 110,118 0.40% 85,313 0.51% 126,864 0.34% 71,590 0.61%
2012/12 465 111,075 0.42% 77,899 0.60% 131,649 0.35% 68,459 0.68%
STOCK OF GENERAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND CREDIT RISK RWAs 
(CREDIT COOPERATIVES) 
TABLE 25
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Footnote in Chart 1 also applies to this chart.
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of the stock of specific and general provisions and Chart 18 shows the coverage of non-
performing loans when all provisions (specific plus general) are considered altogether. It can 
also be observed the breakdown between general and specific provisions and their 
respective coverage of NPLs. The entire picture of the credit cycle is completed with the 
information from Chart 19.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Footnote in Chart 2 also applies to this chart.
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The relative weight that general provisions represent in terms of other relevant balance sheet 
elements can be appreciated in Table 25. It compares the stock of general provisions with 
the stock of credit, total assets and credit risk weighted assets. In terms of credit, provisions 
for credit cooperatives represented up to 1.8%, 1.5% with respect to total assets, and 1.9% 
in terms of credit risk weighted assets. Table 26 presents the overall stock of provisions 
(specific plus general) and its weight in terms of total credit exposures, total assets and total 
RWAs. The increase in non-performing loans and specific provisions together with a 
reduction in size in certain portfolios during the last years, has raised the weight of the stock 
of provisions over credit and total assets to 5% and to more than 8% in terms of total RWAs.
Table 27 compares general provisions with specific provisions showing its relative weight 
over total credit provisions. Connected with this, it is worth noting how during the boom 
Date
Stock of total 
provision (m€)
Credit
exposures (m€)
% Total assets (m€) %
RWA
(Total) (m€)
%
2000/12 556 26,554 2.09% 39,607 1.40% 28,529 1.95%
2001/12 712 31,440 2.27% 46,064 1.55% 33,293 2.14%
2002/12 887 37,713 2.35% 50,490 1.76% 37,932 2.34%
2003/12 1,119 45,813 2.44% 56,165 1.99% 43,788 2.55%
2004/12 1,151 62,163 1.85% 66,349 1.73% 50,189 2.29%
2005/12 1,341 76,187 1.76% 80,546 1.67% 60,619 2.21%
2006/12 1,560 91,591 1.70% 96,207 1.62% 72,023 2.17%
2007/12 1,892 103,291 1.83% 108,429 1.75% 82,590 2.29%
2008/12 2,362 107,050 2.21% 113,010 2.09% 78,713 3.00%
2009/12 2,876 113,814 2.53% 119,457 2.41% 79,852 3.60%
2010/12 3,406 116,296 2.93% 121,577 2.80% 79,300 4.29%
2011/12 3,848 119,879 3.21% 126,864 3.03% 77,225 4.98%
2012/12 6,401 124,819 5.13% 131,649 4.86% 74,273 8.62%
STOCK OF TOTAL PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF CREDIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND TOTAL RISK RWAs 
(CREDIT COOPERATIVES) 
TABLE 26
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
m€
Stock of speci?c 
provision
Stock of general 
provision
Total provisions
% general provision 
over total provision
2000/12 228 328 556 59.05%
2001/12 235 478 712 67.06%
2002/12 243 645 887 72.64%
2003/12 289 830 1,119 74.17%
2004/12 314 837 1,151 72.73%
2005/12 340 1,002 1,341 74.67%
2006/12 361 1,198 1,560 76.84%
2007/12 530 1,362 1,892 71.97%
2008/12 1,304 1,057 2,362 44.77%
2009/12 2,103 773 2,876 26.88%
2010/12 2,891 515 3,406 15.11%
2011/12 3,412 436 3,848 11.34%
2012/12 5,936 465 6,401 7.26%
BREAK-DOWN OF CREDIT PROVISIONS (CREDIT COOPERATIVES) TABLE 27
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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period general provisions represented more than 75% of the total stock of provisions, while 
during the recession period, as a result of the use of general provisions and the increase in 
specific provisions, the latter gained presence in the overall stock of provisions. Currently, 
the fund of general provisions represents 7% of total credit provisions for credit cooperatives.
In terms of impact on the P&L account, Chart 20 shows how the flow of general provisions 
detracted, in peak years, more than 23% of pre-provisioning profit. On the contrary, during 
the depletion period, it contributed to ameliorate the pre-provisioning chart in more than 
31%. In terms of PBT, the flow of general provisions reached 36% in good times and, without 
it, in bad times cooperatives would have barely maintained black charts in the P&L account.
In terms of limits, Table 28 provides information about the maximum limit of the general 
provision per year. Bearing in mind the same caveat already pointed out for other groups 
of entities, at the group’s level, between 2004 and 2006 credit cooperatives were setting 
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CHART 20
m€
General
provision (a)
Max. limit
Difference: Distance 
to the limit
% left to reach
the max.
2000/12 93 366 273 74.51%
2001/12 202 418 215 51.53%
2002/12 325 469 144 30.76%
2003/12 456 547 91 16.62%
2004/12 837 837 0 0.00%
2005/12 1,002 1,007 5 0.55%
2006/12 1,198 1,198 0 0.00%
2007/12 1,362 1,362 0 0.03%
2008/12 1,057 1,360 302 22.24%
2009/12 773 1,294 521 40.26%
2010/12 515 1,235 720 58.33%
2011/12 436 1,194 758 63.47%
2012/12 465 1,093 629 57.50%
LIMITS SET ON THE GENERAL PROVISION (CREDIT COOPERATIVES) TABLE 28 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For coherence purposes, before 2005 general provision only includes the so-called statistical provision. Otherwise, the 
calculation and consideration of limits would not make sense.
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aside general provisions that took their stock close to its maximum limit. After 2008, when 
the depletion phase took placed, the distance to the cap started to increase showing the 
significant usage of the general provisions made by the credit cooperatives.
The distribution of exposures across the six different categories of risk is presented in 
Table 29, where it can also be noticed how the different types of exposures evolved over 
time. Particularly, exposures with no risk increase their weight over total exposures from 
1% in 2000 to 30% in 2012 (interbank exposures where included in this category after 
2004); medium and medium-high risk exposures decreased their weight on cooperatives’ 
credit portfolios from 39% and 16% to 27% and 7% respectively.
Table 30 provides information in terms of the distribution of the general provision across 
categories of risk. As commented for the rest of banking groups, the medium-risk category 
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 1.5% 26.9% 20.5% 40.3% 8.9% 1.9%
2001/12 1.4% 29.8% 21.2% 37.6% 8.0% 2.0%
2002/12 1.3% 33.3% 23.9% 32.8% 7.1% 1.6%
2003/12 1.1% 35.6% 23.4% 32.2% 6.3% 1.3%
2004/12 15.9% 30.8% 25.3% 22.7% 4.1% 1.2%
2005/12 14.9% 32.9% 26.1% 21.5% 3.8% 1.0%
2006/12 14.9% 33.8% 26.6% 20.6% 3.3% 0.8%
2007/12 12.3% 35.4% 27.3% 21.0% 3.0% 0.9%
2008/12 10.7% 38.4% 26.5% 20.7% 2.8% 0.9%
2009/12 15.9% 39.0% 24.6% 17.4% 2.3% 0.8%
2010/12 16.7% 43.6% 21.1% 15.9% 2.0% 0.7%
2011/12 22.6% 39.5% 20.1% 15.2% 1.8% 0.8%
2012/12 29.9% 37.0% 14.9% 13.2% 4.1% 0.9%
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(CREDIT COOPERATIVES)  
TABLE 29
SOURCE: Banco de España.
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 - 10.7% 29.5% 39.0% 15.7% 5.1%
2001/12 - 8.8% 23.1% 47.7% 15.5% 5.0%
2002/12 - 7.9% 22.7% 46.7% 16.8% 5.9%
2003/12 - 6.6% 18.8% 50.1% 17.7% 6.8%
2004/12 - 17.1% 35.1% 37.5% 7.7% 2.7%
2005/12 - 18.5% 36.5% 35.8% 6.9% 2.2%
2006/12 - 19.2% 37.8% 34.8% 6.2% 2.0%
2007/12 - 19.7% 37.9% 34.7% 5.6% 2.1%
2008/12 - 20.7% 37.2% 34.9% 5.0% 2.1%
2009/12 - 22.6% 38.4% 32.2% 4.7% 2.0%
2010/12 - 25.6% 36.3% 31.3% 4.5% 2.3%
2011/12 - 25.9% 35.1% 32.1% 4.1% 2.7%
2012/12 - 30.6% 30.5% 27.5% 7.0% 4.3%
DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL PROVISION ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES
OF RISK (CREDIT COOPERATIVES)  
TABLE 30
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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gathers the largest amount of provisions. Then, the low and medium-low risk categories 
come.
Table 31 presents the coverage of exposures per category of risk along time. The levels of 
coverage reached for each category during the boom years are the result of the values of the 
parameters  and  defined for each category. As the crisis period came along, the reduction 
in coverage affected all categories of risk although not with the same intensity.
For the exercise of comparing the maximum amount of general fund created per category of 
risk and the flow of provisions that for each category of risk were set aside during the current 
crisis, Table 32 includes de following information: the accumulated specific provisions for the 
No risk Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium
risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk
2000/12 – 0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 0.6% 1.0%
2001/12 – 0.2% 0.7% 0.8% 1.3% 1.6%
2002/12 – 0.2% 0.8% 1.2% 2.1% 3.1%
2003/12 – 0.1% 0.5% 1.0% 1.8% 3.3%
2004/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1%
2005/12 – 0.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.4% 3.1%
2006/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1%
2007/12 – 0.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1%
2008/12 – 0.6% 1.5% 1.8% 1.9% 2.4%
2009/12 – 0.4% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 1.9%
2010/12 – 0.3% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.5%
2011/12 – 0.3% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.4%
2012/12 – 0.3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 1.8%
COVERAGE OF EXPOSURES ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES OF RISK 
(CREDIT COOPERATIVES) 
TABLE 31
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
7,666 926 1,477 2,864 1,154 521 724
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
High risk No risk
6.9% 2.3% 8.9% 19.6% 25.3% 51.3% 2.2%
Total portfolio Low risk
Medium-low 
risk
Medium risk
Medium-high 
risk
1,352 266 512 470 76 28
17.6% 28.7% 34.6% 16.4% 6.6% 5.4%
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012). Million €
Accumulated Speci?c Provisions (2008-2012) over Credit exposure (end-2012)
Maximum Provision Fund Accumulated per category of risk. Million €
Coverage of Provisions derived from NPLs with stock of General Provision per category of risk
High risk
APPROACH TO CREDIT EXPOSURES COVERAGE (CREDIT COOPERATIVES) TABLE 32
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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total credit portfolio of credit cooperatives between 2008 and 2012 mounted up to more than 
€7,500 million. Taking into consideration that the maximum general provision fund amounted 
to more than €1,300 million, the potential coverage of specific provisions that the general 
provision could have covered would have been 17.6%. Similarly, it can also be appreciated 
how the specific provisions coming from impaired credits for the different categories of risk 
could have been covered by the general provision. In this regard, the medium-low risk 
category could have been covered above 34%, but the high risk category would only have 
been covered by 5%.
Accumulated specific provisions as a percentage of credit raises to almost 7%, which, in 
this case, again, is increasingly spread across risk categories depending on the implicit 
risk assumed for each one (2.3% for the low category of risk climbing to 51.3% for the 
high risk one). 
The main characteristics that can be highlighted from the analysis carried out at the 
groups’ level are the following: 
All groups of institutions show the same pattern regarding the use of the general provision 
during the crisis. However, there are slight differences in the percentage of provision applied. 
For example, national banks used 90% of the maximum amount of the accumulated stock 
of general provision, former savings bank used more than 92%, whereas the percentage of 
usage for credit cooperatives was only 68%.
In terms of credit exposure, the stock of general provisions is very similar for all groups. At 
their respective peaks, general provisions accounted for up to 1.6% for banks and savings 
banks and 1.8% for credit cooperatives. In terms of assets there are slighter differences 
depending on the group. For banks, general provisions only reached 0.9% at most, 1.1% 
for credit cooperatives and 1.5% for savings banks.
Regarding the counter-cyclical nature of general provisions, it can be said that it has worked 
as such for all groups of institutions. Evidence shows this when taking a look at how much 
general provisions represent in terms of total provisions. For both banks and savings banks, 
the stock of general provision reached peaks near 85%, whereas for credit cooperatives 
general provisions reached 77% of the total stock of provisions. Currently the differences 
hold (in line with the usage of general provisions and the increase in specific provisions). In 
this way, for savings banks general provisions only represent 1.4% of total provisions, 2% for 
national banks and 7.3% for credit cooperatives.
It is also interesting to point out that, in general, all groups were virtually at the verge of 
maximum use of the general provision during the boom years. Currently, given the low 
levels of provision the distance to the upper limit is highly significant for each group.
According to coverage of categories of risk there is wide homogeneity among groups of 
institutions, as it should be according how the general provision is designed. In general, 
the low risk category reached a highest percentage coverage of around 0.7%, while the 
high risk category reached a coverage of 3%. However, this homogeneity is not maintained 
when the crisis hit. As a result, banks and savings banks current coverage is much lower 
compared with that of the credit cooperatives.
Finally in terms of the exercise of comparing the maximum amount of general fund created 
per category of risk and the provisions that for each category of risk were set aside during 
2.5  CONCLUSIONS FROM 
THE ANALYSIS 
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the current crisis, it is clear that the former savings banks has been the group more severely 
hit (more than €107,000 million in specific provisions). As a result, it is this group which 
presents the lowest possible coverage of specific provisions with the stock of general 
provisions. Per type of risk, low risk, medium risk and medium-high risk categories are 
those which would be better covered in terms of the accumulation of general provisions.
In terms of accumulated specific provisions as a percentage of credit, it is interesting to notice, 
that for national banks and credit cooperatives the perception of risk in the design of the 
general provision is in line the real risk incurred by each category (the higher the percentage, 
the higher the risk). However, for savings banks the implicit risk assumed for each category the 
real risk incurred (in particular this happens to the medium-low risk category).
To provide additional information about dispersion at the individual bank-level some of the 
numerical features presented above are included here by means of box-plot charts.
Chart 21 shows the distrubution of the percentage of general provisons over credit upon 
which this provision is calculated by years. In this chart it can be appreciated the maximum, 
minimum, average values as well as the 25th and the 75th percentile values of the ratio of the 
percentage of general provisions over credit exposures. In particular, the upper end of bar at 
the top of the box, per year, represents the maximum value that this percentage reaches for 
an individual entity in each year. 
The upper end of the box presents the value of the individual bank which is at the 75th 
percentile. The horizontal line in the box represents the median value. The lower end of the 
box is the value at the 25th percentile and the lower of the bar at the bottom of the box 
corresponds to the minimum value. 
For practical and presentation reasons the period chosen to analyse the individual 
dispersion has been that corresponding to the current definition of the general provision 
(2004-2012). Selecting this period will enable us to see the evolution of the variables used 
in the most interesting periods during which the general provision has been in force: the 
boom period (accumulation of fund) from 2004 to 2008 and the recession period (depletion 
period) from 2008 to 2012.
Concentrating on the particular features of this chart, it can be said that for the accumulation 
period there is a slight increase in the average percentage as well as an increase in the 
3 Individual analysis
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dispersion across banks. As recession came, the average decreases considerably while 
the dispersion across banks increases
Taking a look at Chart 22 which presents the distrubution of the percentage of general 
provisons over total assets, it can be noticed a resemblance with Chart 21. The pattern 
observed in this chart shows how for the boom period there is a slight increase in the 
average together with an increase in the dispersion across banks. During the depletion 
period, that average decreases significantly and at the same time banks increase their 
dispersion.
Chart 23, shows at the individual level the existing dispersion in the percentage that 
general provisions represent over total provisions. It is very clear how for the accumulation 
years that percentage wasr reall high (median above 80%). From 2008 onwards, general 
provisions start to lose weight over total provisions to finally reach very low levels in 2012 
(median around 13%).
This is the first time that such a detailed numerical analysis of dynamic provisions is carried 
out, covering not only the aggregate level but also relevant distinct groups of banks as well 
as individual banks.
The maximum amount of general or dynamic provisions accumulated at the peak of the 
lending cycle was almost €26 billion. This was possible despite the lack of interest from 
international regulators/supervisors (i.e. at that time countercyclical tools were not considered 
4 Final Conclusions 
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in the toolbox of the supervisors) and in clear contrast with the opinion of accountants, in 
particular, when Spain and the EU moved into the adoption of IFRS. It was quite a novel 
approach for provisions as well as for regulatory tools to deal with the time dimension of the 
lending cycle.
In relative terms, a coverage of 1.1% of credit portfolios (1.5% for those with positive risk 
weights) and of almost 1% of total assets was achieved at the peak of the lending cycle. 
Currently, the general provisions are almost depleted to prove they were designed and 
used as a macro-prudential or countercyclical tool. 
In terms of risk weighted assets, dynamic provisions reached 1.5% of credit risk weighted 
assets at the peak of the cycle (1.2% of total risk weighted assets) which is 60% (half way) 
from the maximum countercyclical capital buffer set at 2.5% designed for Basel III. This is 
an important benchmark in order to assess the usefulness of the countercyclical capital 
buffer in the face of a long and intense credit cycle. 
An important feature of dynamic provisions in Spain is its automatic mechanism both for 
accumulating, and releasing them5. Automatic release in downturns has advantages in 
comparison with similar mechanisms such as those devised in Basel III. It reduces the risk 
of failure in judgment and, thus, softens the responsibilities of both micro and macro 
prudential supervisors.
In any case, the philosophy behind the countercyclical capital buffer is the same as the 
one behind the dynamic provision but with a subtle nuance: dynamic provisions also may 
have an impact on bank managers’ incentives since they impact the bottom line of banks’ 
P&L account. Of course, dynamic provisions were transparent enough so that investors 
could disentangle its impact on the bottom line of the bank.
The countercyclical nature of dynamic provisions is clearly shown in this paper. In the 
expansionary phase, around 85% of total provisions were dynamic or general while, currently, 
in middle of a (second) recession they represent less than 5% of the total, the rest being 
specific provisions.
During the boom period, in particular at its peak, the volume of dynamic provisions was close 
to its cap. This ceiling was necessary given the strong criticism that Spanish dynamic 
provisions received as they were wrongly perceived to be no more than a device to disguise 
hidden reserves. As Chart 1 clearly shows, the adoption of IFRS in 2005 had a relatively small 
impact on the evolution of the absolute amount of general provisions, but it was necessary in 
order to maintain them and, in particular, the embedded countercyclical component.
Table 8 shows that dynamic provisions only covered around 14% of the accumulated specific 
provisions banks made during crisis years. Originally, dynamic provisions (properly speaking 
statistic provisions) were calibrated using the lending cycle that incorporated the 1993 
recession. At the time of calibration (late nineties) the 1993 recession had been the worst 
recession in 30 years in Spain. Moreover, progress in risk management was taken into account 
when finally setting the parameters of the original statistical provision. In 1993 the GDP 
declined a bit more than 1%. In 2009 GDP declined more than 3% and, on top of that, Spain 
experienced a second recession in 2012 that still goes on when we are writing this report (real 
GDP growth in 2012 was –1.4% and the current Banco de España projection for 2013 is 
5  See footnote 2.
–1.5%). It is hardly surprising the average coverage ratio in Table 8 given the substantially 
different magnitude of the crisis faced and the one used to calibrate the provision parameters. 
In terms of accumulated specific provisions as a percentage of credit, it is worth noticing 
that the perception of risk in the design of the general provision seems to be in line with 
the real risk incurred by each category (the higher the percentage of provisions in terms of 
credit for a certain category, the higher the associated risk for that category).
All in all, it can be said that risk categorization was, in general, proportional to the amount of 
accumulated specific provisions between 2008 and 2012. However, in terms of general 
provisions accumulated, the proportionality is lost. Nevertheless, until the final losses are 
fully materialized, it is not possible or advisable to open this debate because there are risks 
of biases: upwards if additional provisions are to be set aside, downwards if further recoveries 
are recorded. So far, we lack the key data to properly assess that.
Moreover, the amount that dynamic provisions that was taken away from pre-provisioning 
profits (between 15% and 20% on average terms) or from profits before taxes (30% to 
36%) was another powerful element to incorporate in the assessment, in particular, around 
the time when IFRS were introduced in Spain.
An issue also worth investigating is the impact of dynamic provisions in the lending cycle 
in itself. Current evidence (Jiménez et al 2013, not yet published), shows that dynamic 
provisions had a small impact at the aggregate level on the expansion of lending but quite 
a positive and significant impact in reducing the credit crunch in the first recession that hit 
the Spanish economy around 2009. This is a complex issue that needs careful analysis 
and, thus, exceeds clearly the scope of this quantitative analysis (see Box 1).
Finally, the fact that group 1 and group 2 banks had accumulated at its peak €7,000 million 
euro of general or dynamic provisions to cover credit losses reduced in an equivalent 
amount the public capital injections required by these banks. The amount saved in this 
counterfactual exercise is close to 1% of the Spanish GDP. 
Using the Banco de España Central Credit Register, for each of the 
three experiments mentioned, a study was carried out that works 
with non-financial firms at two levels: a firm-bank level, local, and 
company level, aggregate. It is analyzed if the buffer generated by 
dynamic provisions before the crisis allows banks to reduce the 
impact of it. At each level a difference in differences analysis was 
realized where it was compared how banks affected differently by 
each shock lend to the same company before and after the 
experiment. Locally, to perfectly control fundamentals of companies 
firm fixed effects were introduced, which implies selecting those firms 
that work with more than one entity. With respect to the bank, balance 
sheet and income statement characteristics were controlled as well 
as a variable measuring in each case, and before the shock, its 
degree of involvement in the experiment (e.g., the ex ante composition 
of its portfolio for the experiment of 2000, or a measure of how close 
the bank’s generic fund was from the minimum required the period 
A detailed and careful empirical analysis of the dynamic provisions 
impact on the lending cycle in Spain can be seen in the ongoing 
work of G. Jimenez, S. Ongena, J.L. Peydró and J. Saurina entitled 
“Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and 
Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning 
Experiments”.
In this paper three important milestones in dynamic provisions are 
identified: its implementation in the third quarter of 2000, its 
subsequent modification in the first quarter of 2005 to conform to 
international accounting standards (IFRS), and the reduction in the 
minimum level required in the last quarter of 2008 to enable entities 
its fully use when the crisis hit. Each of these changes can be 
understood as natural experiments and their study allows knowing 
the impact of countercyclical capital buffers in the supply of credit 
and the real economy.
BOX 1IMPACT OF DYNAMIC PROVISIONS ON THE LENDING CYCLE
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BOX 1IMPACT OF DYNAMIC PROVISIONS ON THE LENDING CYCLE (Cont’d)
a higher generic fund before the crisis, reduced credit less to 
the same companies after the shock than the remainder of banks. 
This same pattern is also observed at the aggregate level, though 
somewhat diluted, as it seems that during times of crisis is more 
difficult to find new financing. In addition, there is a positive effect on 
assets, employment and the probability of survival of the companies 
working with larger buffer entities. It is also observed how banks that 
had close to the minimum required fund, after its reduction cut less 
credit to riskier firms, while those entities which started with a greater 
buffer before the crisis tended to favour more companies less risky.
All these results suggest that countercyclical macro-prudential 
instruments, such as dynamic provisions or more generally capital 
buffers, can work effectively, especially in recessions, because 
they reduce the contractive impact on credit. In upturns, 
excluding the obvious impact on buffer accumulation to be used 
in downturns, its moderator impact on credit seems lower, which 
should lead to complement these countercyclical measures with 
other elements which, at least, affect the aggregate availability of 
liquidity in the system.
prior to its decline in the last quarter of 2008). This variable would 
capture the effect of dynamic provisions on lending.
Locally, what has been observed is that in the credit cycle upswings 
(shocks of 2000 and 2005) the banks which have to provision 
relatively more (less) reduce credit more (less) to the same company 
after the shock (and not before) that the banks which have to 
provision relatively less (more). That is, a pro-cyclical prudential 
regulation, such as dynamic provisions, reduces credit availability. 
Nonetheless, this effect is not maintained at the aggregate level 
shortly after the shock, suggesting that for companies during the 
growth cycle it is relatively easy to find new financing among banks 
less affected by the new provisions for example. Also, it is checked 
how the most affected banks cut more credit from companies less 
risky ex post, which would be indicative of greater risk taking as a 
way to offset the higher requirements.
During the crisis, locally, banks with a fund generated by dynamic 
provisions close to the minimum required (i.e., the main beneficiaries 
of its reduction in 2008) as well as the entities that started with 
